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ABSTRACT
Verification and Validation in Software Product Line Engineering
By Edward A. Addy
Verification and Validation (V&V) is currently performed during application
development for many systems, especially safety-critical and mission-critical systems.  However,
the V&V process has been limited to single system development.  This dissertation describes the
extension of V&V from an individual application system to a product line of systems that are
developed within an architecture-based software engineering environment.
In traditional V&V, the system provides the context under which the software will be
evaluated, and V&V activities occur during all phases of the system development lifecycle.  The
transition to a product line approach to development removes the individual system as the
context for evaluation, and introduces activities that are not directly related to a specific system.
This dissertation presents an approach to V&V of software product lines that uses the domain
model and the domain architecture as the context for evaluation, and enables V&V to be
performed throughout the modified lifecycle introduced by domain engineering.
This dissertation presents three advances that assist in the adaptation of V&V from single
application systems to a product line of systems.  The first is a framework for performing V&V
that includes the activities of traditional application-level V&V, and extends these activities into
domain engineering and into the transition between domain engineering and application
engineering.  The second is a detailed method to extend the crucial V&V activity of criticality
analysis from single system development to a product line of systems.  The third advance is an
approach to enable formal reasoning, which is needed for high assurance systems, on systems
that are based on commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
V&V methods are used to increase the level of assurance of critical software, particularly
that of safety-critical and mission-critical software.  Software V&V is a systems engineering
discipline that evaluates software in a systems context [Wallace and Fujii 1989a].  The
Verification and Validation (V&V) methodology has been used in concert with various software
development paradigms, but always in the context of developing a specific application system.
However, the product line software development process separates domain engineering from
application engineering in order to develop generic reusable software components that are
appropriate for use in multiple applications.
The earlier a problem is discovered in the development process, the less costly it is to
correct the problem. To take advantage of this, V&V activities begin within system application
development at the concept or high-level requirements phase.  However, a product line software
development process has tasks that are performed earlier, and possibly much earlier, than high-
level requirements for a particular application system.
In order to bring the effectiveness of V&V to bear within a product line software
development process, V&V must be incorporated within the domain engineering process.
Failure to incorporate V&V within domain engineering will result in higher development and
maintenance costs due to losing the opportunity to discover problems in early stages of
development and having to correct problems in multiple systems already in operation.  Also, the
same V&V activities will have to be performed for each application system having mission or
safety-critical functions.
On the other hand, it is not possible for all V&V activities to be transferred into domain
engineering, since V&V within domain engineering does not have identical goals to V&V within
application engineering.  Domain engineering V&V focuses on considerations across multiple
systems, including the extensibility and flexibility of the product line architecture, generic
functionality of components, and conformance to interface definitions.  Application engineering
V&V focuses on considerations related to a specific application system, such as timing and
capacity constraints and involvement of a component in a specific critical process.  This leads to
the question of which existing (and/or new) V&V activities would be more effectively performed
in domain engineering rather than in (or in addition to) application engineering.  Related
questions include how to identify the reusable components for which V&V at the domain level
would be cost-effective, and how to determine the level to which V&V should be performed on
the reusable components.
Software product lines routinely rely on the use of Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
software for which source code and design information is not available.  Methods to reason about
systems that include COTS components, and to guide the testing of COTS components, are
needed in order to provide the high level of assurance often required in critical systems.
1.1  Verification and Validation in Traditional System Application Engineering
V&V has been performed during application system development, within the context of
many different development methodologies, including waterfall, spiral, and evolutionary
development.  V&V is a set of activities performed in parallel with system development and is
designed to provide assurance that a software system meets the needs of the user.  It ensures that
the requirements for the system are correct, complete, and consistent, and that the life-cycle
products correctly implement system requirements.
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The term verification refers to the process of determining whether or not the products of a
given phase of the software development cycle fulfill the requirements established during the
previous phase.  The term validation means the process of evaluating software at the end of the
software development process to ensure compliance with software requirements [IEEE 610.12
1990].  Verification is intended to ensure that the product is built correctly, while validation
assures that the correct product is built (in the sense that the product meets the needs of the user).
While verification and validation have separate definitions, in practice the activities are
merged into a single process.  This process evaluates software in a systems context, using a
structured approach to analyze and test the software against system functions and against
hardware, user and other software interfaces [Wallace and Fujii 1989a].  V&V is also described
as a series of technical and management activities performed to improve the quality and
reliability of that system and to assure that the delivered product satisfies the user’s operational
needs [Lewis 1992].
V&V activities are designed to be independent of but complementary to the activities of
the development and test teams.  The development team is usually focused on nominal
performance and the testing is usually based on requirements and operational profiles.  V&V
includes both analysis and tests, and considers critical and off-nominal behavior throughout all
phases of the development lifecycle.  V&V activities also complement the activities of the
configuration management and quality assurance groups rather than being a duplicate or
replacement of these activities [Wallace and Fujii 1989b].
A set of minimal and optional V&V activities is defined in the IEEE Standard for
Software Verification and Validation Plans [IEEE 1012 1992].  These activities are divided into
the life-cycle phases listed below.  The minimum V&V tasks for critical software are shown in
Table 1-1.
• Management of V&V
• Concept Phase V&V
• Requirements Phase V&V
• Design Phase V&V
• Implementation Phase V&V
• Test Phase V&V
• Installation and Checkout Phase V&V
• Operations and Maintenance Phase V&V
V&V is performed as a part of a risk mitigation strategy for application systems.  The
risks can be in areas such as safety, security, mission, finance, or reputation.  The scope and level
of V&V can vary with each project, based on the criticality of the system and on the role of
software in accomplishing critical functions of the system [Makowsky 1992].  V&V is used to
determine which software functions are involved in high-risk areas, and V&V activities are
focused on this critical software.  Criticality analysis is used to determine not only the critical
software, but also the level of intensity to which each V&V task should be performed on various
components of the critical software [IEEE 1059 1993].
1.2   Justification for Performing V&V within Domain Engineering
Studies have shown that the cost and difficulty of correcting an error increases
dramatically as the error is discovered in later life-cycle phases [Boehm 1976, Makowsky 1992].
V&V  addresses that issue in traditional system development hrough activities that begin in the
3
PHASE TASKS




Concept Concept Documentation Review
Requirements Software Requirements Traceability Analysis
Software Requirements Evaluation
Software Requirements Interface Analysis
System Test Plan Generation
Acceptance Test Plan Generation
Design Design Traceability Analysis
Design Evaluation
Design Interface Analysis
Component Test Plan Generation






Implementation Source Code Traceability Analysis
Source Code Evaluation
Source Code Interface Analysis
















Installation and Checkout Installation Configuration Audit
V&V Final Report Generation




Table 1-1.  Minimum V&V Tasks for Critical Software in Application Engineering
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concept or high-level requirements phase and continue throughout all life-cycle phases.  The
V&V activities are focused on high-risk areas, so that errors in the high-risk areas can be
discovered in time to evolve a complete and cost effective solution rather than forcing a
makeshift solution due to schedule constraints.
Within product line software engineering, software engineering activities may be
performed prior to the concept phase of a particular application system.  In order to extend the
benefit of early error detection to software product line engineering,   V&V must be incorporated
within the domain engineering process.  Performing V&V at the domain level may also reduce
the level of effort required to perform V&V in the individual application systems.
Although software is the target of V&V activities, software does not execute in isolation,
but rather as an integral part of a system [Duke 1989].  In order to provide assurance that critical
functions will be performed correctly, software must be evaluated within the context in which it
will execute.  In product line software engineering, the context for V&V must be provided by the
domain model and domain architecture [Ran 1999].
1.3  Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation describes the extension of the activities of V&V from the development
environment of single systems to the development environment of a product line of systems.
The current chapter presents an overview of V&V and of software product lines, and motivates
the need for extending V&V into software product lines.  Chapter 2 discusses other work that is
related to the topic of V&V and software product lines.  Chapter 3 presents a framework for
performing V&V within a software product line environment.  Chapter 4 describes the extension
of criticality analysis from single system development to software product line development.
Chapter 5 presents a method that enables formal reasoning about software systems that are based
on Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products, which is a common occurrence within software
product lines.  Chapter 6 presents a summary of this work and discusses future areas of research
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CHAPTER 2 - RELATED WORK
We are not aware of any other research that is focused specifically on the area of
performing verification and validation within software product lines.  However, there is much
work addressing areas directly related to this research, including the V&V process, software
product lines, reusable component certification, criticality analysis, and COTS integration.
These areas are discussed below.
2.1  Verification and Validation Process
IEEE standards provide industry guidance for conducting V&V.  The IEEE Standard for
Software Verification and Validation Plans [IEEE 1993] designates a set of minimal and optional
V&V activities.  These activities are divided into the life-cycle phases listed in Chapter 1.  In
addition to the standard, the IEEE has approved the Guide for Software Verification and
Validation Plans [IEEE 1993] to provide information on the tailoring and application of the
standard.
The chair and co-chair of the working group for the original 1986 IEEE Standard for
Software Verification and Validation Plans were, respectively, Roger Fujii and Dolores Wallace.
Shortly after the publication of the standard, Fujii and Wallace also authored several publications
that served to define the V&V process.  These publications include a NIST Special Publication
entitled Software Verification and Validation: Its Role in Computer Assurance and Its
Relationship with Software Project Management Standards [Wallace 1989a] and an article
entitled “Verification and Validation: An Overview” [Wallace 1989b] in an issue of IEEE
Software that focused on V&V.  This issue of IEEE Software contained several other papers
describing aspects of the V&V process [Musa 1989, Duke 1989, Dunham 1989].  A general text
book on V&V was published in 1992, authored by V&V practitioner Robert Lewis and entitled
Independent Verification and Validation, A Life Cycle Engineering Process for Quality Software
[Lewis 1992].  Callahan and Sabolish discuss a process improvement model for software
verification and validation [Callahan 1996].  Kitchenham and Linkman argue for the strategy of
selecting a diverse set of V&V techniques based on the functionality and quality required by the
product [Kitchenham 1998].
Many organizations have developed guidelines for V&V that are tailored to their
particular development or acquisition process and to the domain of their systems.  Examples of
these documents include A Guide to Independent Verification and Validation of Computer
Software, written for the Army Mission-Critical Computer Resources programs under the
Communications-Electronics Command [Makowsky 1992], the NASA Software Assurance
Guidebook [NASA 1989], and NIST guidelines for performing V&V for health care systems
[Wallace 1996].
All of this work in V&V has focused on the development of individual software systems.
The processes and activities are set entirely within the environment of application engineering,
and do not consider the existence of any software development activities outside of the
individual system being developed.  No V&V activities are considered for software artifacts such
as domain models, generic architectures, or reusable components.
2.2  Software Product Lines
The concept of software product lines grew out of work in the related areas of software
reuse and domain-specific software architectures.  Software product lines are a specialized form
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of software reuse, and the product line architecture plays a central role in the development and
evolution of a software product line.
The topic of software product lines has recently emerged as a distinct area of study, with
national and international workshops held beginning in 1996 [ARES 1997, Bass 1997, Addy
1998a, Bass 1998a, Clements 1998].  The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie
Mellon University has established a Product Line Practice Initiative, and has published a case
study on product line engineering [Brownsword 1996].  Robyn Lutz has performed an analysis
of requirements that support a product line, and in particular analyzed the product line
components for hazards using efforts similar to Software Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
and Software Fault Tree Analysis [Lutz 1999].
[Garlan 1996] offers an overview of the state of the art in software architectures, although
this overview is directed more toward system architectures than toward product line
architectures.  The analysis of software architectures is the focus of  attention and discussion
[Tracz 1996, Garlan 1995], but there is not as yet consensus on methods and approaches.  One of
the approaches being researched that may be applicable to product line architectures  is a
scenario-based analysis approach, Software Architecture Analysis Method [Kazman 1995].  In
the area of tracking dependencies between domain and application components, the Centre for
Requirements and Foundations at Oxford is developing a tool (TOOR) to support tracing
dependencies among evolving objects [Goguen 1996].
Two of the leading texts that deal with the combined issues of software reuse and
software architecture are [Jacobson 1997] and [Bass 1998b].  The SEI has also produced two
reports on software architecture that address the issue of evaluating a software architecture
[Abowd 1997] [Barbacci 1997].  [DeBaud 1997] describes a methodology with tool support to
enable the development and deployment of software product lines.
2.3  Component Certification
Much work has been done in the area of component certification, which is also called
evaluation, assessment, or qualification.  These terms can have slightly different meanings, but
refer in general to rating a reusable component against a specified set of criteria.
Reuse libraries often use a discrete scale to indicate the degree of effort and the methods
by which the library has evaluated a component.  The Asset Source for Software Engineering
Technology (ASSET) library and the Army Reuse Center library both have four levels of
certification, although the use of the term “levels” is operationally different in the two libraries
[Poore 1992].  The libraries evaluate reusable components against criteria such as reusability,
evolvability, maintainability, and portability, as well as expending various amounts of effort to
ensure the component meets its specification.
The Certification of Reusable Software Components Program at Rome Laboratory has
proposed a certification framework based on removing defects from candidate reusable
components [SPS 1996].  This certification process consists of four levels of analysis and testing,
each designed to remove certain categories of defects from the reusable component.  The levels
of analysis and testing correspond to more stringent levels of certification, which are composed
of the factors of scope and confidence.
The Comprehensive Approach to Reusable Defense Software (CARDS) library is a
model-based library based on a generic architecture.  Reusable components are evaluated not
only on the same general criteria as that of component-based libraries, but also on the “form, fit,
and function” relative to the generic architecture [Unisys 1994].  The CARDS library uses this
difference to draw a distinction between “certification” and “qualification.”  The Component
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Providers and Tool Developers Handbook defines component certification as “The process of
determining if a component being considered for inclusion in a library meets the requirements of
the library and passes all testing procedures.  Evaluation takes place against a common set of
criteria (reusability, portability, etc.).”  Component qualification is defined as “The process of
determining if a potential component is appropriate to the library and meets all quality
requirements.  Evaluation takes place against domain criteria." (Italics added for emphasis.)
Hence, qualified components not only meet quality requirements of the library related to testing
and standards, but are also appropriate for the domain area and architectural style of the library.
Knight and Dunn [Knight 1998] have proposed an evaluation framework that extends
beyond functional correctness to consider other aspects of reusable components, such as
performance, maintainability, portability, readability, and testability.  They propose that the
aspects of interest in the reusable components be determined relative to their ability to support
desired properties in the application products.  Their scheme first determines the qualities desired
in the application products, and then uses this information to determine the properties that the
components should have and the techniques by which the properties will be demonstrated.
As in other industries, manufacturers of software systems acquire components and turn
these into consumer products.  The common thread through all of these certification processes is
the focus on the component rather than the systems in which the component will eventually be
(re)used.  Dunn and Knight note that with the exception of the software industry itself, customers
purchase systems and not components [Dunn 1993].  Ensuring that components are well
designed and reliable with respect to their specifications is necessary but not sufficient to show
that the final system meets the needs of the user.  Component evaluation is but one part of an
overall V&V effort, analogous to code evaluation in V&V of an application system.
Another distinction between V&V and component certification is the scope of the
artifacts that are considered.  While component certification is primarily focused on the
evaluation of reusable components (usually code-level components), V&V also considers the
domain model and the generic architecture, along with the connections between domain artifacts
and application system artifacts.  Some level of component certification should be performed for
all reusable components, but V&V is not always appropriate.  V&V should be conducted at the
level determined by an overall risk mitigation strategy.
2.4  Criticality Analysis
V&V is performed as a part of a risk mitigation strategy for application systems.  The
risks can be in areas such as safety, security, mission, finance, schedule, or reputation.  The
scope and level of V&V can vary with each project, based on the criticality of the system and on
the role of software in accomplishing critical functions of the system [Makowsky 1992].  V&V
determines the software involved in high-risk areas, and V&V activities are focused on this
critical software.
The existing risk methods that are concerned with operation risk include Criticality
Analysis and Risk Assessment (CARA) [McCaugherty 1998], and criticality analysis in
Independent Software Nuclear Safety Analysis (ISNSA) [NASC 1989] and in the Independent
V&V (IV&V) methods of the USAF Space Division [Shere 1998].  These methods do not
identify the areas of operation risk, but rather are used to prioritize subsections of the software
based on their association with operation risk.  The subsections being prioritized are usually
either sections of the requirements document or design or code modules.  These methods require
that studies (e.g., safety analysis, mission analysis) be performed prior to the criticality/risk
assessment, and that the software artifact be decomposed into the subsections to be prioritized.
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CARA was developed by Averstar, Inc. (formerly Intermetrics, Inc.), primarily in the
context of IV&V of the Space Station and Shuttle programs.  CARA is used to prioritize code
modules in order to determine the level of IV&V to be applied to each module.  CARA assigns
an ordinal value of “criticality” to the relationship of each code module with mission, safety, and
development, and an ordinal value of “risk” based on the Complexity, Maturity of Technology,
Requirements Stability, Testability, and Developer Experience for the module.  The CARA score
of a module  is the product of the average criticality score and the average risk score, and this
score is used to prioritize the modules.  The restriction of criticality considerations to mission,
safety, and development rises from the context in which CARA was developed (e.g., security
was not a major issue).
ISNSA was developed to provide assurance for nuclear weapons systems deployed by the
U.S. Navy; hence the only area of interest was (nuclear) safety.  The United Stated government
requires the design of nuclear weapons to include a sequence of stages that must be achieved
prior to detonation, and the activities that cause a weapon to reach particular stages are termed
critical factors.  Criticality analysis within ISNSA uses ordinal values to indicate the involvement
(direct, indirect, none) of requirements subsections or code modules with each of the critical
factors, and the maximum of these values across all critical factors is used to determine the
priority of the component.
Criticality analysis as performed by the USAF Space Division is similar to CARA in that
the criticality of a component is determined by the average product of the severity level and
likelihood level across all critical factors.  However, the critical factors are determined uniquely
for each system rather than using a predetermined set, which allows more flexibility in dealing
with software from different domains.  The critical factors are divided into the two categories of
performance factors and delivery factors, where performance factors are concerned with
operation issues and delivery factors are concerned with development issues.
2.5  COTS Integration
COTS components are routinely used as significant portions of systems developed using
a software product line approach.  Systems that require higher levels of assurance often need to
use some amount of formal methods as a part of the assurance process.  While there is on-going
work on developing COTS-based software and on the use of formal methods in the reuse
community, there are few concrete efforts to integrate both of these issues.
A significant part of COTS work is on comparative evaluation [Oberndorf 1997],
although there is no accepted standard of evaluation [Carney 1997, Challenge 2000]. The
National Product Line Asset Center (NPLACE) has established a method of evaluating COTS
products against a set of predefined testable criteria.  Voas has developed a method for COTS
certification that involves testing the product based on the operational profile of the system,
system-level fault injection, and operational system testing [Voas 1998].  He also advocates
taking defensive measures by putting a wrapper around the COTS software to limit the output of
the COTS software to acceptable values.  However, [Weyuker 1998] discusses many difficulties
in effectively testing components that are being used to construct a system, either as individual
components or within the developed system.  [Leach 1997] suggests that the best approach may
be to locate a COTS vendor that can be trusted, and attempt to match the interface specifications.
Formal methods literature addresses issues in supporting component certification
[Leavens 1998], component selection [Chen 1997], and component modification [Jeng 1994].
However, none of these considers the formal specification of COTS software.
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CHAPTER 3 - FRAMEWORK FOR PERFORMING V&V WITHIN PRODUCT LINE
SOFTWARE ENGINEERING1
One model for reuse-based software engineering is the Two Life-Cycle Model shown in
Figure 3-1, developed by the U.S. Department of Defense Software Technology for Adaptable,
Reliable Systems (STARS) program.  This model assumes a domain-specific, architecture-
centered approach to software reuse.  The domain model describes the problem space of the
domain, and expresses requirements.  The domain architecture describes the solution space of the
domain, while the domain components are intended to be used within application systems to
meet the functions described in the domain architecture.  The arrows depict the dependencies
between the activities.  Multiple boxes within Application Engineering indicate that multiple
systems can be developed from the products of Domain Engineering.
A draft framework for performing V&V within product line software engineering is
formed by adding V&V activities to the STARS Two Life-Cycle Model.  The application-level
IV&V tasks described in [IEEE 1012 1992] serve as a starting point.  Domain-level tasks are
added to link life-cycle phases in the domain level, and correspondence tasks in the transition
level are added to link application phases with domain phases.  This draft framework was refined
by a working group at Reuse ‘96 [Addy 1996], and further described in [Addy 1998b].  A
diagram of the resultant framework is shown in Figure 3-2.  The specific tasks of each phase at
the domain and transition levels are listed in Table 3-1.
Domain-level V&V tasks are performed to ensure that domain products fulfill the
requirements established during earlier phases of domain engineering. Correspondence tasks in
the transition between the domain level and the application level provide assurance that an
application artifact correctly implements the corresponding domain artifact.  Traditional
application-level V&V tasks ensure the application products fulfill the requirements established
during previous application life-cycle phases.
Performing V&V tasks at the domain and transition levels will not automatically
eliminate any V&V tasks at the application level.  However, it might be possible to reduce the
level of effort for some application-level tasks.  For example, if domain level V&V has
demonstrated that a component correctly implements a specified functionality, application level
V&V can focus on the use of the functionality within the context of the system.
Domain maintenance and evolution are handled in a manner similar to that described in
the operations and maintenance phase of application-level V&V.  V&V evaluates the changes
proposed to domain artifacts in order to determine the impact of the proposed correction or
enhancement.  If the evaluation determines that the change will impact a critical area or function
within the domain, appropriate V&V activities are repeated to assure the correct implementation
of the change.
Although not shown as a specific V&V task for any particular phase of the lifecycle,
criticality analysis is an integral part of V&V planning.  Criticality analysis is performed in V&V
of application development in order to allocate V&V resources to the most important (i.e.,
critical)  areas of the software [IEEE 1059 1993].  This assessment of criticality and the ensuing
determination of the level of effort for V&V  tasks are crucial also within product line software
                                                          
1 Portions of this chapter appeared in the Annals of Software Engineering, Vol 5, 1998, and are used here by









































































Figure 3-2.  Framework for V&V within Reuse-Based Software Engineering
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software engineering.  The adaptation of criticality analysis from application development to
product line software engineering is discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
3.1  Domain-Level Tasks
The domain-level tasks are analogous to the application-level tasks, in that the products
of each phase are evaluated against the requirements specified in the previous stage and against
the original user requirements.  The domain-level tasks can be divided into the three phases of
domain analysis, domain design, and domain implementation, which correspond to the
application phases of requirements, design, and implementation.
During domain analysis V&V, the V&V team should ensure that the domain model is an
appropriate representation of the user requirements.  (The singular term "model" is not intended
to imply that only one model will be constructed; this term is used to mean the one or more
models that express the domain requirements.)  Note that ensuring that user requirements are
satisfied implies that the requirements of the domain must be explicitly stated.  Criticality
analysis is performed to ensure that high risk requirements are appropriately addressed, either
mission-critical requirements or those related to properties such as safety and security.  The
criticality analysis should also determine critical functions that will be performed by software.
The domain model is evaluated to ensure that the requirements are consistent, complete, and
realistic, especially in the high risk areas.  The model is evaluated to determine responses to error
and fault conditions and to boundary and out-of-bounds conditions.  As the domain engineering
progresses into later phases, the requirements are traced forward.  This will allow evaluation of




Domain Analysis Validate Domain Model
Model Evaluation
Requirements Traceability Analysis (especially forward
traceability for completeness)




Component Test Plan Generation
Component Test Design Generation
Domain
Implementation





Component Test Case Generation
Component Test Procedure Generation
Component Test Execution
Transition Requirements Correspondence Analysis between System Specification and
Domain Model
Design Correspondence Analysis between System Architecture and
Domain Architecture
Implementation Correspondence Analysis between System Implementation and
Domain Components
Table 3-1.  V&V Tasks for Life-Cycle Phases at the Domain and Transition Levels
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Domain design V&V tasks focus on ensuring that the domain architecture satisfies the
requirements expressed in the domain model.  Each requirement in the domain model should
trace to one or more items in the domain architecture (forward traceability), and each item in the
domain architecture should trace back to one or more requirements in the domain model (reverse
traceability).  The domain architecture is evaluated to ensure that it is consistent, complete, and
realistic.  Interfaces between components are evaluated to ensure that the architecture supports
the necessary communication between components in the architecture, users, and external
systems.  Planning and design of component testing are performed during this phase.  The
component testing should include error and fault scenarios, functional testing of critical
activities, and response to boundary and out-of-bounds conditions.
Domain Implementation V&V tasks ensure that the domain components satisfy the
requirements of the domain architecture and will satisfy the original user requirements.  The
components should have a forward and reverse tracing with the domain architecture.
Components that are involved with performing critical actions should receive careful
consideration.  The interface implementation, both within components of the architecture and
with systems outside the architecture, is evaluated to ensure that it meets the requirements of the
domain architecture.  Component test cases and test procedures are generated, and component
testing is performed.
Integration test activities are explicitly omitted from the domain-level tasking, since
integration testing is oriented toward application-specific testing.  Some form of integration
testing might be appropriate within domain-level V&V in the case where the architecture calls
for specific domain components to be integrated in multiple systems.  This limited form of
integration testing could be done along with the component testing activities.
3.2  Correspondence Tasks
Correspondence analysis is a term not found in [IEEE 1012 1992].  The term is used
within this dissertation to describe the activities that are performed to provide assurance that an
application artifact corresponds to a domain artifact; i.e., the application artifact is a correct
implementation of the domain artifact.  Four activities are to be performed during
correspondence analysis:
• Map the application artifact to the corresponding domain artifact.
• Ensure that the application artifact has not been modified from the domain artifact
without proper documentation.
• Ensure that the application artifact is a correct instantiation of the domain artifact.
• Obtain information on testing and analysis on a domain artifact to aid in V&V
planning for the application artifact.
Correspondence analysis is performed between the corresponding phases of the domain
engineering and application engineering life-cycles.  The system specification for any system
within the domain should correspond to the domain model.  The system specification could
involve instantiating, parameterizing, or simply satisfying the requirements expressed in the
domain model.  Any system-unique requirements should be explicit, and the rationale for not
addressing these system-unique requirements within the domain model should be stated.
Although some degree of correspondence analysis should be at least implicitly performed for all
systems developed in accordance with the domain architecture, more care should be taken for
systems with critical functions and for their critical areas of software.
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The system architecture is analyzed to ensure that it satisfies the requirements specified
in the domain architecture.  Any variations should be documented along with the reason for the
variation.  The rationale for parameters chosen or options selected in constructing the system
architecture from the domain architecture should be recorded.
The system components are analyzed to ensure correspondence to domain components.
Again, variations, parameters, and options should be recorded along with their rationale.
Baseline testing might be appropriate in order to compare variants of a domain component.
3.3  Communicating Results
Communicating V&V work products and results is vital to avoiding the repetition of
V&V tasks and to ensuring that potential reusers can properly assess the status of reusable
components.  V&V work products and results should be associated with the component and
made available to domain and application engineers.  In some cases, V&V efforts might be
directed at a grouping of components rather than at an individual component, and this
information should also be available.  Groupings might include components that are expected to
occur together in several applications, or might include variants of one domain artifact.
The information on similar types of components within the domain should be consistent
in content and format, in order to allow the information to be easily used by both domain
engineers and application engineers.  The information that should be communicated includes the
following:
• V&V Planning Decisions and Rationale
• V&V Analysis Activities
• V&V Test Cases and Procedures
• V&V Results and Findings
The framework presented in this chapter provides an overall structure for performing
V&V in an architecture-centered approach to reuse-based software engineering.  Since V&V is
one portion of an overall risk mitigation strategy, criticality analysis plays a crucial role in
determining the level of V&V that will be performed and the portions of the software that will
receive the most attention.  The next chapter discusses the process of criticality analysis within a
reuse-based environment.
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CHAPTER 4 – DETERMINING LEVELS OF ASSURANCE
In accord with the state of the practice in V&V, current methods of criticality analysis
that are used to determine the level of assurance required by components are directed at
individual application systems.  Criticality analysis needs to be extended to include consideration
of multiple application systems developed from reusable components. The result of this
extension to the current criticality analysis methods is a method to evaluate the criticality of
reusable components within a product line that can be used to guide the level of effort for V&V
within the product line.
4.1  Criticality Considerations
The Component Verification, Validation and Certification Working Group at WISR 8
considered the issue of V&V within reuse-based software engineering.  This working group
found four considerations that should be used in determining the level of V&V for reusable
components: [Edwards 1997]
• Span of application – the number of components or systems that depend on the
component
• Criticality – potential impact due to a fault in the component
• Marketability – degree to which a component would be more likely to be reused by a
third party
• Lifetime – length of time that a component will be used
The concept of criticality is related to the concept of “software risk,” which is an
overloaded term within software engineering literature.  The more general term of “risk” usually
receives a more formal definition, and has a more uniform meaning across the literature.  The
typical definition of risk is the expected loss from an unwanted event, and risk is calculated as
the product of the loss from the unwanted event and the probability of the unwanted event
occurring.  In evaluating software risk, the concept of loss is usually termed as “severity,” and
values are assigned from an ordinal set whose range is fixed by the method as a means of
normalizing severities of different types (e.g., injury to a human, cost overrun, schedule
slippage).  Many of the software risk evaluation methods also use a value from an ordinal set
rather than a true probability, so the term “likelihood” is more appropriate than “probability” in
these methods.
While the meaning of risk is generally accepted, differences arise among the existing
software risk evaluation methods in determining the set of unwanted events, and in the manner in
which the risk of the unwanted events are evaluated.  The set of unwanted events of a particular
method fall into one of two general categories: operation risk and development risk.  The set of
unwanted events for operation risk focuses on outcomes from the actual use of the system, where
operating the delivered system causes an undesired outcome of some type.  In development risk,
the set of unwanted events centers on the development of the system, and is concerned with the
system being developed on schedule, in budget, and with full specified functionality.
Operational risk is the category of software risk needed to evaluate the criticality of artifacts in a
software product line.
The activities performed by the current application-oriented, operation risk evaluation
methods can be used to evaluate the criticality consideration for reusable components listed by
the WISR working group, but extensions must be made to include the other considerations of
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span of application, marketability, and lifetime.  The extended method must be able to accept the
evaluation of the criticality and lifetime of a component in multiple systems (i.e., the span of
application), as well as the consideration of being used in other systems (e.g., marketability).
The following definitions will be useful in discussing the evaluation of the level of assurance
required by a component within the context of a product line of systems.
For a component within a particular system
severity - level of worst-case impact due to an error in the component
longevity - level of time during which the component is anticipated to be used in
the system
risk - indication of the likelihood and maximum severity of an undesired
event due to an error in the component
criticality - indication of the risk in the lifetime usage of the component in the
system
For a component independent of any particular system
likelihood - level of probability that the component has an error
marketability - anticipated level of use of the component beyond the identified
systems
assurance - relative level of effort needed for assurance of this component
The method of determining the assurance level of reusable components described below
is based primarily on the CARA method used during IV&V of NASA software, as described in
Chapter 2.  The method includes some modifications to the basic CARA method in order to
make the terminology more consistent with the general literature and to include elementary risk
factors from other methods.  The intent of this description is not to propose CARA as the ideal
method for determining assurance levels, but rather to demonstrate how any such method can be
extended from considering a single application system to considering a software product line.
4.2 Criticality
To determine the likelihood that a component has errors, the component is evaluated
against a set of Likelihood Drivers.  The drivers were determined by examining similar drivers in
CARA, the SEI Risk Evaluation Method [Sisti 1994], and a risk assessment method based on the
COCOMO scale drivers [Madachy 1997].  The Likelihood Drivers are divided into the
categories of Product, Process, and Personnel, and are listed in Table 4-1.  Each component is
rated against each driver on a scale of 1 to 3, where 1 indicates a low level of risk of an error due
to the driver and 3 indicates a high level of risk.  The overall Likelihood Score for the component
is the average of the likelihood scores over the nine drivers.
The severity level of each component must be determined relative to each system in
which the component will be used.  The component is rated on a scale of 0 to 4 against each of
three severity categories, according to the outcome of maximum severity to which an error in the
component could contribute within the system.  The categories and rating scales are shown in
Table 4-2, with same descriptions of the ratings.  The rating descriptions should be tailored to the
conditions and situation of the actual product line.  The overall Severity Score for the component
relative to a system is the average of the three severity levels for the categories.
The product of the Likelihood Score for a component and the Severity Score for a
component/system pair is called the Risk Score (which is consistent with the usual definition of
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3 Critical degradation of
mission
major injury, irreparable
damage to the system or
to the environment
some loss of security
2 Marginal loss of secondary
functions
minor injury, repairable
damage to the system or
to the environment
loss of some security
protection





Table 4-2.  Component Severity Categories and Ratings
risk as the product of the severity of an unwanted event and the likelihood of the unwanted event
occurring).    The Risk Score is determined for each system in which the component is, or is
anticipated to be, used.  This accounts for the concept of span of application as described by the
WISR working group.  The Risk Score is multiplied by a Longevity Score, which indicates the
timeframe (short, medium, or long) in which the component is anticipated to be used by the
system.   The Risk Score accounts for the working group’s concept of lifetime, but is determined
at the system level because the timeframe of use of the component may vary by the system.  The
product of the Risk Score and the Longevity Score is called the Criticality Score for a component
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and system.  The sum of the Criticality Scores for a component across all systems in the product
line is called the Criticality Score for the component, and is an indicator of the risk of using the
component over its lifetime in all systems in the product line.
4.3  Marketability
The remaining concept listed by the WISR working group is marketability, which was
defined as the degree to which a component would be more likely to be reused by a third party.
This concept is extended to include the use of the concept in any system not included in the
product line.  This use includes future systems in the product line that are anticipated, but were
not sufficiently defined for the component to be evaluated for severity, likelihood, and longevity.
The component’s Criticality Score must be adjusted not only for the number of additional
systems in which its use is anticipated, but also for the variance in the risk and longevity profiles.
Thus the marketability factor includes three terms:
1. the ratio of the total number of systems in which the component is anticipated for use
with the number of systems in the product line,
2. the ratio of the average risk of the component across all systems to the average risk of
the component in the systems in the product line, and
3. the average longevity of the component across all systems with the average longevity
of the component across the systems in the product line.
If the risk and longevity profiles of the additional systems cannot be estimated, the
average of the systems within the product line can be used as an estimate.  Assuming that their
averages are equal to the averages of the systems in the product line will eliminate the second
and third terms, leaving only the ratio involving the number of systems.
4.4  Assurance
The product of the component’s Criticality Score and the Marketability Score is called
the Assurance Score, and indicates the level of assurance needed by this component relative to
the other components in the product line.  Components with a higher Assurance Score generally
require a higher level of assurance than do components with a lower Assurance Score.  Table 4-3
summarizes all values used to determine a component’s Assurance Score, and indicates either the
meaning of an input score or the method to calculate a derived score.
The values of the component Assurance Scores should be used as a guide to compare the
relative level of assurance needed for components within the product line, with higher Assurance
Scores indicating the need for more intensive levels of assurance.  However, the association of
absolute scores to distinct levels of assurance will be dependent on the domain of the product
line, and on the agreement of the scoring group on the definitions of the severity ratings and the
likelihood scores.  Comparison of scores across different product lines is not generally
meaningful, because of different assumptions and agreements by different scoring groups.  In
addition, factors other than the absolute score should be considered in determining the level of
assurance required by a component.  For example, a component that scores critical or higher in
the safety severity category for any system, and has a Likelihood Score of 2 or 3, might need a
relatively high level of assurance regardless of its overall Assurance Score.
4.5  Case Study Illustration
The product line assurance scoring method is illustrated using a product line case study
proposed for use in academic settings [Addy 1999].  The product line consists of a number of
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INPUT VALUES
CiSjAk Severity Score : level of worst-case impact on the severity area in the system due to an error in the component
CiLm Likelihood Score : level of probability that the component has an error due to the likelihood driver
CiSj Longevity Score : level of time during which the component is anticipated to be used in the system
Ci Marketability Score : level of anticipated use of the component in systems beyond the identified systems
CALCULATED VALUES
Ci Likelihood Score = AVERAGE over all Ci Likelihood Drivers
CiSj Severity Score = AVERAGE over all CiSj Severity Drivers
CiSj Risk Score = Ci Severity Score * CiSj Likelihood Score
CiSj Criticality Score = CiSj Risk Score * CiSj Longevity Score
Ci Criticality Score = SUM over all j CiSj Criticality Score
Ci Marketability Score = (s + additional systems using Ci) / s
  * AVERAGE over additional systems Severity Score / AVERAGE over j CiSj Severity Score
  * AVERAGE over additional systems Longevity Score / AVERAGE over j CiSj Longevity Score
Ci Assurance Score = Ci Marketability Score * (Ci Operation Risk Score)
=
                                                 S
Ci Marketability Score *     (   Σ     CiSj Criticality Score * CiSj Longevity Score )
                                                j=1
=
                                           S
Ci Marketability Score *   Σ    (CiSj Severity Score * Ci Likelihood Score * CiSj Longevity Score)
                                          j=1
Table 4-3.  Determining Relative Levels of Needed Assurance for Components in a Software Product Line
simulations for waiting queues, including queues such as a CPU dispatcher, a self-service car
wash, grocery check-out counters, immigration stations, and airline check-in counters.   As part
of a class project, a two-person team developed a product line architecture and reusable
components for the product line.  The architecture, depicted in Figure 4-1, is centered on a
dynamic event list as the communication vehicle between cooperating layers of objects. In
addition to the event list, the primary components in the architecture are a customer generator, a
customer repository, a queue facility, a server facility, a measurement recorder, and a driver to
initiate the other objects and to control the simulation.  The queue facility consists of a set of
queue categories, where each category consists of a set of customer queues.  This hierarchy
enables the simulation to consider different groups of queues, such as express and normal
grocery check-out counters and first-class and coach-class airline check-in counters.  The server
facility similarly consists of a set of server categories, each of which is a set of servers.   A
customer queue contains information that is needed by all waiting queues, but must be fully
implemented using either a (normal) queue or a priority queue, depending on the system.
The product line assurance scoring method was applied by the author (who was one of
the two developers in the class project) to determine the relative assurance levels of the
components within this product line architecture.  Since none of the systems has any relation to
safety or security, the mission category was the only category to receive a non-zero severity
rating. The scoring assumed that no component would be used in any systems other than those
defined in this product line, and that all components would be used for a medium period of time.
The results of the scoring are shown in the first set of scores in Table 4-4.  Part 1 of Appendix A
contains the exact scoring of each of the components against each system.  Since the Schedule
Manager and the Customer Generator are specific to the application, they do not appear in the
list of product line components.  The most critical components are the Customer and the Event
List components, which are used in every system and are crucial to the mission in each system.
The least critical component is the Priority Queue, which is used in only one system.
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Figure 4-1.  Architecture for the Waiting Queue Simulation Product Line
Scores with no longevity or
marketability assumptions
Scores with longevity and
marketability assumptions
Criticality Marketability Assurance Criticality Marketability Assurance
Customer 32.59 1.00 32.59 16.30 1.00 16.30
Customer Queue 19.56 1.00 19.56 22.00 1.14 25.00
Event 29.63 1.00 29.63 32.59 1.36 44.44
Event List 32.59 1.00 32.59 35.85 1.36 48.89
Measurement 29.63 1.00 29.63 32.59 1.36 44.44
Priority Queue 5.33 1.00 5.33 5.33 6.00 32.00
Queue 23.63 1.00 23.63 26.89 1.00 26.89
Queue Category 25.78 1.00 25.78 27.70 1.00 27.70
Queue Facility 25.26 1.00 25.26 28.44 1.00 28.44
Server 22.00 1.00 22.00 24.44 1.01 24.69
Server Category 27.70 1.00 27.70 30.96 1.00 30.96
Server Facility 25.26 1.00 25.26 28.52 1.00 28.52



























The scoring was repeated using different assumptions on marketability and longevity.
These scores are shown in the second set of scores in Table 4-4, with the complete scoring
shown in Part 2 of Appendix A.  The assumptions used during the second scoring are shown
below.
• The developer believes the Server, Customer Queue, Priority Queue, Measurement,
Event and Event List components related to simulating CPU Dispatching can be
marketed to five customers.
• The two check-out counter simulations will be in use for a relatively long period of
time.
• The Customer component will be replaced in all systems in the near future.
Since the marketing assumption is related to the CPU Dispatching system, the
marketability score is adjusted using the ratio of the score for the CPU Dispatching system
divided by the average over all the systems.  Specifically, the marketability score contains the
following ratios:
1. Severity score for CPU Dispatching system
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
   Average Severity score over all systems
2. Longevity score for CPU Dispatching system
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________
   Average Longevity score over all systems
Using these assumptions, the Event List, Event, and Measurement components are the
most critical.  The rise in assurance level of the Event and Measurement components is due to
their marketability. The Priority Queue component has also experienced a sharp rise in its
assurance level due to its anticipated use in other systems.  The drop in the assurance level of the
Customer component is due to its relative short anticipated lifespan.
This examples illustrates that the relative level of assurance of components can change
not only with the introduction of new systems that use the component, but also with anticipated
use in unidentified systems or with a change in the anticipated lifespan.   The assurance scoring
should be repeated with major product line events such as revisions to the domain architecture,
the introduction of new technologies, or the addition or elimination of systems to the product
line.
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CHAPTER 5 – FORMAL REASONING ABOUT COTS-BASED SYSTEMS2
Software product lines routinely employ commercial software developed by third parties
as reusable components.  COTS3 software is almost always delivered in source code or
executable form, and rarely is there direct access to the requirements or design documentation.
When COTS software is employed in life-critical, mission-critical, or in any system with
significant financial stakes, it is essential to ensure that the integrated system is reliable.
Typically, it is neither possible nor feasible to develop complete, formal descriptions of
behaviors of COTS products.  But unless the behaviors are described formally, it is not possible
to use rigorous techniques for specification of or reasoning about COTS-based safety-critical
systems.  This dissertation describes a solution to this issue that is based on complete
specification of partial functionality of a COTS product, and illustrates the solution approach
using a realistic case study.
A fundamental issue to be tackled in using a COTS product is the specification of the
safety-critical subsystem.  To the extent required in mathematical modeling and specification of
the critical subsystem, features of the COTS product need to be modeled mathematically and
described in mathematical interface contract(s).  To perform formal reasoning or rigorous
validation of the implementation of the COTS-based subsystem, programmatic interface
contract(s) or specification of the commercial product or legacy system is necessary.  The
programmatic interfaces are similar in spirit to those advocated in [Meyer 1992] and they make
use of the models in the mathematical contracts.  Together, the interface contracts isolate and
precisely describe those aspects of the COTS product that affect the application system.  In
addition to enabling unambiguous understanding and formal reasoning, precise descriptions of
the interfaces also guide the testing that must be performed on the COTS product and integration
testing.
The case study [Addy 1999a] that forms the basis of this chapter concerns a subsystem of
the Surface Movement Advisor (SMA) system, a joint Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) effort.  The objective of the SMA
is to assist air-traffic controllers in the area of ground movement control.  SMA uses a COTS
database product, among others.  Our experience in specifying and implementing a subsystem of
SMA demonstrates that mathematical modeling of software subsystems is possible, even in the
presence of significant COTS software usage.
5.1  Surface Movement Advisor
SMA is a proof-of-concept prototype demonstration to test the implementation of
advanced information systems technologies to improve coordination and planning of ground
                                                          
2 Portions of this chapter appeared in the Proceedings of the Symposium on Software Reusability, May 1999, and is
used here by permission of the publisher.  Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or
commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for
components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy
otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee.
3 The term COTS is used to reference commercial software developed by a third party.  However, much of the
discussion in this chapter applies to any software previously developed outside the application development
environment, including legacy and public domain software, and other non-developmental items.
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airport-traffic operations.  SMA is primarily a data fusion and dissemination system, integrating
airline schedules, gate information, flight plans, radar feeds, and runway configuration (including
departure split and landing direction).  This integrated information is shared among airport ramp
operators, managers, airline operators, and FAA controllers and supervisors.  As a prototype
system, SMA currently is targeted for the Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport.
The subsystem of SMA considered in this case study deals with prediction of the times of
key events for flights.  This subsystem is responsible for determining the most likely time for
flight events such as time of pushback from the gate, takeoff time, landing time, and gate arrival
time.
The case study is a shadow development effort, based on the SMA Systems
Requirements Document, Build 1, of SMA [SMA 1995].  The focus of the study is the
“departure part” of the prediction subsystem that is concerned with predicting flight takeoff
times.  All departing flights leave the airspace surrounding an airport through one of several
designated points, called Departure Gate Areas (DGAs).  The DGAs can be conceived as
horizontal tunnels in the sky through which the flight must pass.  The DGA that a flight will use
is determined by the destination of the flight.
Each airport has a set of standard configurations, or “splits”, that determines the runway
that a flight will use based on the DGA of the flight.  The airport has a number of pre-defined
splits, but splits may also be created on an ad-hoc basis.  The DGAs and some of the pre-defined
splits at Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport are depicted in Figure 5-1. A key goal of the air-
traffic controller is to minimize the time that the planes spend after pushback waiting to take off.
This is done by attempting to keep the runways balanced in terms of utilization.
To make predictions on flight departures, SMA needs access to a large amount of flight
and airline information.  This information is managed using an Oracle database, a COTS
product.  The database contains (among other information) the scheduled, predicted, and actual
pushback time for each flight, the call number for the plane, the aircraft type, the boarding gate,
and the DGA the flight will use.  The users can display the cumulative wait times for each
runway, one split at a time, or can display a graphical comparison of all the splits.  (The display
can show the cumulative wait times for any window starting at the current time and ending 15 to
60 minutes in the future.)
5.2  Formal Specification of the Flight Takeoff Prediction Subsystem
The Prediction Subsystem is responsible for calculating the cumulative wait times and the
predicted takeoff time for each flight, given the runway, the split to be used, and the time
window.  The focus of the problem is predicting the time of takeoff for a flight, taking into
account the time the flight pushes back from the gate and considering other flights that might
impact the time of takeoff.
An object-based specification for the takeoff time prediction subsystem, named
Simulate_Runway_Machine_Template, is summarized in Figure 5-2, and the complete
specification in RESOLVE notation [Sitaraman 1994] is contained in Appendix B.  (Other
formal notations, such as Larch, VDM, or Z [Wing 1990], could have been used equally well.)
Simulate_Runway_Machine_Template provides a prediction simulation type, and operations to
manipulate objects of the type.  It is a result of “recasting” the prediction algorithm as an object.
The idea of recasting graph and simulation algorithms as object-based machines, and the
performance and software engineering benefits of the idea are discussed elsewhere [Weide
1994a].
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Figure 5-1.  Departure Gate Areas and Several Predefined Splits for Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport
(conceptual drawing, not to scale)
An object-based specification for the takeoff time prediction subsystem, named
Simulate_Runway_Machine_Template, is summarized in Figure 5-2, and the complete
specification in RESOLVE notation [Sitaraman 1994] is contained in Appendix B.  (Other
formal notations, such as Larch, VDM, or Z [Wing 1990], could have been used equally well.)
Simulate_Runway_Machine_Template provides a prediction simulation type, and operations to
manipulate objects of the type.  It is a result of “recasting” the prediction algorithm as an object.
The idea of recasting graph and simulation algorithms as object-based machines, and the
performance and software engineering benefits of the idea are discussed elsewhere [Weide
1994a].
The summary of the specification shown in Figure 5-2 contains a context section showing
a list of “imports” and an interface section of “exports”.  In the figure, the global context imports
Standard_Partial_SMA_Departure_Database_Facility, because the current specification relies on
the mathematical modeling of database attributes described in that module. The local context
contains mathematical definitions or math operations (explained later) that make it possible to
write assertions in the interface section concisely.
In the interface of this concept, objects of the type Simulate_Runway_Machine_State are
modeled mathematically as a 6-tuple:  sid and rid, respectively, denote the split identification and
SPLIT NW/SE NWE1/SE2 NE/SW N/SWE
DGAs using the north runway N1, N2, W1, W2 N1, N2, W1, W2,
E1
N1, N2, E1, E2 N1, N2
DGAs using the south runway S1, S2, E1, E2 S1, S2, E2 S1, S2, W1, W2 S1, S2, W1, W2, E1,
E2
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Figure 5-2.  Flight Departure Prediction Concept
concept Simulate_Runway_Machine_Template
   context
      global context
         facility Standard_ Partial_SMA_Departure_
            Database_Facility
      local context
--  mathematical definitions of
--  In_Line, Cumulative_Wait_Time_Def,
--  Safety_Delays_Met, Actual_Takeoff_Times_Used,
--  and Taxi_Times_Met
         math  operation Well_Formed_Runway_Queue (
               q: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR,
               sid: SPLIT_ID,
               rid: RUNWAY_NAME,
               db: SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL) : boolean
         explicit definition
            for all ft: FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR
               where (db.runway_used(ft.f) = rid or
                 (db.runway_used(ft.f) = empty_string and
                  db.assigned_runway
                                 (sid,db.departure_gate_area(ft.f))   = rid)
               (In_Line(q, ft.f, db))
            and Safety_Delays_Met(q, rid, db)
            and Actual_Takeoff_Times_Used(q, db)
            and Taxi_Times_Met(q, rid, db)
         math  operation Proper_Flights_In_Queue (
               sid: SPLIT_ID,
               rid: RUNWAY_NAME,
               tbegin: DISCRETE_TIME,
               tend: DISCRETE_TIME,
               q: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR,
               db: SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL) : boolean
         explicit definition
            for all ft: FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR
               where IS_ENTRY_OF(q, ft) (
               tbegin <= ft.t <= tend)
            and
            there exists c: CONFIGURATION,
               q1: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR
               where (db.c.id = sid and
                  Well_Formed_Runway_Queue(q1, sid, rid, db)) (
                (Is_Substring (q, q1) )
   interface
      type Simulate_Runway_Machine_State is (
               sid: string of character,
               rid: string of character,
               tbegin:  DISCRETE_TIME,
               tend:  DISCRETE_TIME,
               q: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR,
               ready_to_extract: boolean)
         exemplar m
         constraints
            Is_Allowed_Split_Name (m.sid) and
            Is_Allowed_Runway_Name (m.rid) and
            m.tend >= m.tbegin
         initialization ensures m.ready_to_extract = false
--  an operation to put the machine to a state able to accept
--  new values (i.e., not in extraction phase), operations to set
-- and obtain the values of the split ID,  the runway ID, and
-- the beginning and ending times, and an operation to check
-- if the machine is in extraction phase.
      operation Simulate_Runway (
            alters   m: Simulate_Runway_Machine_State,
            preserves db: SMA_Database_Machine)
         requires m.ready_to_extract = false
         ensures Proper_Flights_In_Queue
                                 (m.sid, m.rid, m.tbegin, m.tend, m.q,db)
            and m.sid = #m.sid and m.rid=#m.rid and
            m.tbegin=#m.tbegin and m.tend=#m.tend and
            m.ready_to_extract=true
      operation Extract_Next (
            alters   m: Simulate_Runway_Machine_State,
            produces  flight_number: Char_String,
            produces  takeoff_time: Integer)
         requires |m.q| /= 0 and m.ready_to_extract = true
         ensures #m.q = <flight_number, takeoff_time> * m.q
            and m.sid=#m.sid and m.rid=#m.rid and
            m.tbegin=#m.tbegin and m.tend=#m.tend and
            m.ready_to_extract=#m.ready_to_extract
      operation Cumulative_Wait_Time (
            preserves m: Simulate_Runway_Machine_State,
            preserves db: SMA_Database_Machine,
            produces wait_time: Integer)
         ensures Cumulative_Wait_Time =
            Cumulative_Wait_Time_Def (m.q, m.rid, db)
      operation Queue_Length_Of (
            preserves m: Simulate_Runway_Machine_State,
            produces  length: Integer)
         requires m.ready_to_extract = true
         ensures length = |m.q|
end Simulate_Runway_Machine_Template
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runway identification for which simulation is to be done. tbegin and tend denote the window for
simulation.  The central part of the model is the field q that contains the results of the simulation;
it is a string (or sequence) of ordered pairs denoting which flight is predicted to depart at what
time.  The purpose of the Boolean ready_to_extract in the model will become clear in the
following discussion. When it is true, conceptually, results from simulation are available for
extraction.  The specification also states, using an exemplar object, the constraints and
initialization guarantees on every object of the type.  Notice that initially ready_to_extract is
false. The interface provides the following operations on prediction simulation objects:
• operations to set/get simulation parameters (split, runway, start time, and end time);
• an operation to instruct the machine to simulate;
• an operation to extract the flight number and time at which the next flight is predicted
to take off;
• an operation to get cumulative wait time for the current simulation; and
• status-checking operations to see if the information on the next flight can be extracted
and if there are any more flights for take off in the simulated window.
In a typical use of the object, after simulation parameters are set, the Simulate_Runway
operation will be called.  This operation uses and preserves the database, but alters the machine
state.  It requires that the machine be in the insertion phase, i.e., m.ready_to_extract Boolean
must be false.  For the operation to work as specified in the ensures clause, the requires clause
must hold when it is called.
The conceptual effect of calling the Simulate_Runway operation is that it ensures that
appropriate string of flights with their actual or predicted takeoff times are now available in the
prediction simulation queue “m.q”.  The operation also sets the ready_to_extract flag to true
indicating that the simulation results are available.  In the ensures clause, #m denotes the value of
parameter m before the call and m denotes its value after the call.
The effect of the Simulate_Runway operation has been specified formally using a
mathematical definition Proper_Flights_In_Queue.  This definition uses another definition,
Well_Formed_Runway_Queue, that specifies when a mathematical string (or sequence) of
flight/take-off time pair is a valid simulation, based on database information such as push back
times, taxi times, and runway delays.  The definition Proper_Flights_In_Queue is additionally
concerned with a given window of time.  Both of these definitions, as well as others not listed
explicitly in the figure, are based on departure database information.  The relevant database
details are contained in db, modeled by SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL.  Details of this
model are the topic of the next subsection.
The Extract_Next operation requires that the results be ready for extraction, and it
produces the predicted values of the next flight number and associated takeoff time.
Cumulative_Wait_Time operation returns the total wait time of the flights in line (as specified
formally in the mathematical operation Cumulative_Wait_Time_Def).  The Queue_Length_Of
operation returns the number of flights left in the prediction simulation window of time.
5.3  Mathematical Modeling of Aspects of A COTS Database
It is clear that the specification in Figure 5-2 can be meaningful only if there is a suitable
mathematical modeling of database information. The mathematical description of
SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL should contain all information relevant for predicting take-
off times, but nothing more.  Such a description, termed a mathematical interface contract, is
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Figure 5-3.  Mathematical Modeling of Database Information
given in the interface of the mathematics module SMA_Database_Math_Machinery in
RESOLVE notation in Figure 5-3.
Unlike a concept specification, such as the one in Figure 5-2, that provides program types
and operations to manipulate programming objects, the purpose of a mathematics module is to
define mathematical types and definitions useful for writing specifications.  Mathematics
modules are not implemented.  They simply establish formal meanings for domain vocabulary to
be used in other specifications.  They are similar in spirit to Larch traits [Wing 1990].
In Figure 5-3, SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL is defined to be a math subtype.  A
math subtype is essentially a base mathematical type with zero or more constraints on the value
space [Heym 1998, Rushby 1998].  In the definition of SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL,
other math subtypes have been defined and used, though most of them have not been shown.
This database model consists of a collection of functions needed in the prediction system.   For
example, predicted_pushback_time is a function from the character string FLIGHT_ID into
DISCRETE_TIME.  In this case, the base mathematics type for DISCRETE_TIME is integer,
where the values are constrained to be non-negative integers.
 Some of the information in the database is particular to the specific airport.  This
information has been isolated and specified separately in another mathematics module
SMA_Database_Airport_Information (not shown).  It contains information such as airport-
specific gate names, flight identifications, and standard splits, and it is used to isolate airport-
specific information to a separate module.  Together the mathematical modules define
mathematical interface contracts of the COTS product.  For the prediction system, any database
can be used as long as it contains at least the information corresponding to the mathematical
modeling in Figure 5-3.  The example illustrates that in general, formal specification of COTS-
mathematics SMA_Database_Math_Machinery
   context
      global context
         mathematics SMA_Database_Airport_Information
   interface
      math subtype FLIGHT_ID is string of character
         exemplar fid
         constraint Is_Allowed_Flight_ID(fid)
-- similar math subtypes for AIRCRAFT_TYPE_NAME,
-- GATE_NAME, OPTIONAL_GATE_NAME, DGA_NAME,
-- RUNWAY_ID, OPTIONAL_RUNWAY_ID,
-- and SPLIT_ID
      math subtype GATE_RUNWAY_PAIR is (
            g: GATE_NAME,
            r: RUNWAY_ID )
      math subtype CONFIGURATION is (
            sid: SPLIT_ID,
            split: function from DGA_NAME to RUNWAY_ID)
      math subtype FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR is (
            f: FLIGHT_ID,
            t: DISCRETE_TIME)
      math subtype SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL is (
            aircraft_type: function from FLIGHT_ID to
               AIRCRAFT_TYPE_NAME
            gate: function from FLIGHT_ID to
               OPTIONAL_GATE_NAME
            departure_gate_area: function from FLIGHT_ID to
               DGA_NAME
            runway_used: function from FLIGHT_ID to
               OPTIONAL_RUNWAY_ID
            predicted_pushback_time: function from FLIGHT_ID
               to DISCRETE_TIME
            actual_pushback_time: function from FLIGHT_ID to
               OPTIONAL_DISCRETE_TIME
            actual_takeoff_time: function from FLIGHT_ID to
               OPTIONAL_DISCRETE_TIME
            delay_time: function from AIRCRAFT_TYPE_NAME
               to DISCRETE_TIME
            roll_time: function from AIRCRAFT_TYPE_NAME
               to DISCRETE_TIME
            taxi_time: function from GATE_RUNWAY_PAIR to
               DISCRETE_TIME
            configuration: set of CONFIGURATION )
    end SMA_Database_Math_Machinery
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based systems may require selected aspects of the COTS products to be modeled mathematically
and captured formally.
5.4  Modular Reasoning about a COTS-Based Subsystem
This section describes a component-based implementation of the prediction subsystem.
To show that this implementation meets its specification, and for the reasoning process to be
modular, only on the specifications of reused components are essential [Ernst 1991, Leavens
1991, Weide 1994b].  To be able to reason in a modular fashion about a COTS-based
implementation, it is essential to have a programmatic interface contract(s) or specifications for
relevant parts of the COTS product.  This is the topic of this section.
Figure 5-4 provides an illustration to explain the basic premise of modular reasoning.  In
the figure, an oval represents the specification of a component, whereas a rectangle represents an
implementation.  A thin arrow labeled “i” indicates an implements relationship and a thick arrow
labeled “u” indicates a uses relationship.  In order to verify that the implementation in the figure
satisfies its specification, only the specifications of reused components (numbered 1, 2, and 3)
are needed.  No knowledge of the rest of the system in which the component will be used is
necessary and no knowledge of details of implementations of reusable components is necessary.
Modular reasoning essentially makes it possible to reason about one implementation at a time,
and is therefore, scalable.   This basic idea is independent of whether the reasoning process is
formal or informal, automated or manual.
Figure 5-5 shows the structure of a COTS-based implementation of the flight departure
prediction subsystem.  The implementation uses the specification of a part of the (ideal,
complete) COTS database specification, as well as other supporting specifications.  As shown in
the figure, the database interface has been separated into two concepts, one that specifies basic
database retrieval operations and another that specifies a highly application-specific extensive
database query.  These interfaces need to be implemented based on the COTS software, and they
serve as the contract(s) between the prediction subsystem and COTS database.  (Math models
used in the contracts are not explicitly shown in the figure.)
Figures 5-6 and 5-7 contain programmatic database interface contracts (or specifications)
for Partial_SMA_Departure_Database_ Template and SMA_Database_Flight_Finder_Template.
The specification in Figure 5-6 makes use of the models in the mathematical unit shown
in Figure 5-3 in the previous section.  The global context of the figure explains this linkage by
referring to SMA_Database_Math_Machinery. In the interface section, the Database object is
modeled by SMA_DEPARTURE_ DB_MODEL.  The operations specify basic database
retrieval operations.
The other part of the Database interface,  SMA_Database_Flight_Finder_Template, is
shown in Figure 5-7.  This interface specifies an extended database query,
Select_Flights_To_Runway, for simulating the runway.  The query locates all flights that either
have used the specified runway or will use the runway based on the specified split, and orders
them by takeoff time (if they have already departed) or time of pushback from the gate (actual
pushback times followed by predicted pushback times).  The exported type is the conceptual
value of the result of this selection query.  The other two operations are used to return the next
flight ID from the ordered selection, and to check on the number of flights remaining from the
selection.
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Figure 5-4.  Illustration of Modular Reasoning










































Figure 5-6.  Database Interface Contract (part 1)
Figure 5-7.  Database Interface Contract (part 2)
concept SMA_Database_Flight_Finder_Template
   context
      global context
         facility Standard_ Partial_SMA_Departure_
            Database_Facility
      local context
         math operation
            All_Flights_To_Runway_In_Pushback_Order (
               q: string of FLIGHT_ID,
               sid: SPLIT_NAME,
               rid: RUNWAY_NAME,
               db: SMA_DATABASE_MACHINE): boolean
          explicit definition
            all the flights that have taken off from the specified
            runway or that are assigned to the specified runway
            by the split are  in the string, and the flights are in
            order of (by precedent)
               (1) actual takeoff time (if the flight has taken off),
               (2) actual pushback time
                    (if the flight has pushed back from the gate but
                     has not taken off),
               (3) predicted pushback time
                    (if the flight has not pushed back from the gate).
   interface
      type Flight_Finder_State is modeled by (
            q: string of FLIGHT_ID)
         exemplar ff
         initialization ensures    |ff.q| = 0
      operation Select_Flights_To_Runway (
            alters   ff: Flight_Finder_State,
            preserves sid: Char_String,
            preserves rid: Char_String,
            preserves db: SMA_Database_Machine)
         requires  Is_Allowed_Split_Name (sid) and
            Is_Allowed_Runway_Name (rid)
         ensures
            All_Flights_To_Runway_In_Pushback_Order
            (ff.q, sid, rid, db)
      operation Get_Next_Flight_To_Runway (
            alters   ff: Flight_Finder_State,
            produces  fid: Char_String)
         requires   |ff.q| > 0
         ensures #ff.q = <fid> * ff.q
      operation Number_Of_Flights_To_Runway (
            preserves ff: Flight_Finder_State,) : Integer
         ensures    Number_Of_Flights_To_Runway = |ff.q|
end SMA_DB_Departure_Get_Flights_Template
concept Partial_SMA_Departure_ Database_Template
   context global context
      mathematics SMA_Database_Math_Machinery
   interface
      type SMA_Database is modeled by
         SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL
         exemplar db
      operation Aircraft_Type (
            preserves db: SMA_Database_Machine,
            preserves fid: Char_String): Char_String
         requires Is_Allowed_Flight_ID (fid)
         ensures db.aircraft_type(fid) = Aircraft_Type
        operation Taxi_Time (
            preserves db: SMA_Database_Machine,
            preserves gid: Char_String,
            preserves rid: Char_String): Integer
         requires Is_Allowed_Flight_ID (fid)
            and Is_Allowed_Gate_Name (gid)
         ensures db.taxi_time ((gid, rid)) = Taxi_Time
-- similar operations to obtain the Gate, Runway_Used,
-- Departure_Gate_Area, Predicted_Pushback_Time,
-- Actual_Pushback_Time, and Actual_Takeoff_Time
-- associated with a flight ID; the Delay_Time and
-- Roll_Time associated with an aircraft type; and the
-- Assigned_Runway associated with a split and DGA
end Partial_SMA_Departure_Database_Template
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Together, the interfaces in Figures 5-6 and 5-7 accurately capture programmatic aspects
of the COTS product, relevant to the SMA departure prediction subsystem.
5.5  Status
The specification for the SMA subsystem has been implemented in RESOLVE/C++
[Hollingsworth 1994].  The implementations of the database concepts depend on the particular
database product and its structure, and consist primarily of Structured Query Language (SQL)
queries.
The shadow development effort, on which this case study is based, uses an mSQL
database rather than the Oracle database that is used by the developer.  The implementations for
an mSQL database have substantial differences from implementations using Oracle,  but each
implementation should meet the mathematical and programmatic interface contracts.  A change
in the choice of the underlying COTS database affects only the implementations of the database
interface concepts.  No other specifications or implementations will be impacted by changing the
COTS package, or by changing the physical storage within the database instance.
A separate part of the application instantiates Simulate_Runway_Machine_Template, sets
the runway, split, and times, and then obtains cumulative wait time for the runway and the
predicted takeoff times for the flights.  This part of the software is responsible for storing the
data as necessary in the database and for displaying the data (hence there are no operations in
these concepts to store or display data). The concepts and implementations are suitable for any
airport.  The only changes are relegated to an airport-specific data module.
5.6  Lessons Learned
The specifications described in this chapter are a result of an iterative process.  An
important objective of the overall effort is to ensure that the process and the results are more
generally applicable than to the particular case study.
There is an interactive nature between the specification of the application and the
specification of the (aspects of interest of the) COTS product.  In the case study, the objective
was to perform a mathematical modeling of the application subsystem, with the focus on
determining the wait time of the line of flights at a runway.  The COTS product (or rather, the
nature of a generic COTS database) provided restrictions on the mathematics model.  Hence, the
mathematical model was developed so that the application used specific known capabilities of
the COTS product, and the model served to formally specify the aspects of the COTS product
that were needed by the application subsystem. This interaction between the application
subsystem and the COTS product to be used appears to be a natural process; it seems unlikely
that specifications would be developed in anticipation that a COTS product would be found to
meet them.
In the case study, we followed a spiral process model, beginning with the specification of
the application concept Simulate_Runway_Machine_Template.  The mathematics module(s)
were next in order, to define the basic subtypes and the functions of the database.  The
programmatic database interface contracts were the last concepts to be developed.  The
refinements continued until the specifications were suitable for developing the COTS-based
subsystem.
The mathematical units are separated into reusable and application/airport-specific parts.
Similarly, programmatic database interface contracts are split into two portions for ease in
development and for anticipated reuse. The Partial_SMA_Departure_Database_Template
specification is used to describe basic data retrieval operations for a database, whose form is
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unlikely to change with modifications to either the application or the COTS database.  This
specification may be used in the specification of other parts of the SMA system with changes
only by the addition of other retrieval operations.  The SMA_Database_Flight_Finder_Template
specification describes a specific query that is unique to the subsystem being specified, which is
more likely to be modified and less likely to be of use in other parts of the system.
The implementation of the specifications in C++, using the mSQL database, was a
straight forward effort following completion of the specifications.  One interesting problem arose
in the implementation, when testing revealed that the ordering clause of the selection operation
did not work on non-numeric fields of the database (at least in the version of the database being
used in the case study).  The implementation of the database interface had to be modified to
include a sorting algorithm.  This is an example of how differences in a particular COTS product
may affect the interface implementation, but the effect is localized, and therefore, does not affect
other specifications or implementations.
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis has discussed the extension of the V&V process from the development of a
single application system to the development of a product line of systems.  The framework
provides an overall structure for V&V activities in domain engineering, application engineering,
and in the transition between domain and application engineering.  The product line assurance
scoring method allows the determination of the relative levels of assurance needed by the
components within the product line, so that appropriate V&V resources can be given to the
various components.  Full specification of partial functionality of COTS products provides a
method to formally reason about systems within the product line that are based on COTS
products, a method to isolate the system from the particular brand and version of the COTS
product, and a guide to testing the COTS products.
The framework for performing V&V within software product line engineering allows
some V&V activities to be performed prior to the development of an individual application
system, and hence provides the opportunity for finding and correcting errors earlier.  This
framework allows the V&V effort to be amortized over the systems within the product line.  Just
as with V&V in application system development, V&V should be performed as part of an overall
risk mitigation strategy within the product line.
The product line assurance scoring method considers the operation risk of each
component within each system in the product line, the length of time that the component is
anticipated to be in use, and the potential use of the component in systems not yet identified.
These considerations allow a determination of the relative level of assurance needed by the
component, so that the V&V effort on the component can be scoped to the proper level of
intensity.
Ideally COTS software products would have formal specifications of behavior that can be
used in establishing the correctness of systems built using the products.  COTS products of today
do not have such specifications due to research, technical, and economic limitations. Given this
state of practice, this thesis illustrates using a realistic case study how formal methods can be
applied to COTS-based safety-critical systems. In specifying and implementing a product line of
systems based on a COTS product, the thesis explains that it is sufficient to describe only aspects
of the reused product that are relevant to the use of the product within the domain architecture.
To the extent the COTS product is reliable, the approach is useful to ensure that the interactions
between the individual systems and the COTS products are valid.
Description of interactions involves mathematical modeling of aspects of the COTS
products as well as formal specification of programmatic interfaces based on those models. Some
aspects of the modeling and some of the interface specifications are reusable in other
applications, and hence should be isolated into separable units. .  The interface contracts isolate
the system under development from the COTS software.  Changes and improvements to COTS
software products have no impact on the system;  where there is an impact it is seen through the
interfaces.  The interface contracts facilitate formal reasoning and also serve as a guide to the test
process to validate the use of COTS software. These results are generally applicable though this
dissertation has used a database COTS product as the central example.
The framework presented in this dissertation for performing V&V in software product
line engineering is currently an outline with few details.  V&V tasks that are currently performed
at the application level need to be adapted for the domain level, and traceability tasks need to be
adapted for the transition level. New methods not used on applications but appropriate for
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domain models or architectures need to be considered.  Since V&V should be performed as part
of an overall risk mitigation strategy within the domain or product line, methods of domain
criticality analysis need to be developed, with attention paid to support from emerging
architecture description languages.  The methods identified need to be validated by use in
projects having an architecture-based software engineering approach to producing applications
that require V&V.
The implementation of product line software engineering not only affects the process of
V&V, it also impacts other software engineering support activities.  These other areas of
software engineering that are affected include Configuration Management, Testing, Quality
Control, and certification.  Activities in each of these areas must be adapted to address the entire
domain or product line rather than a specific application system.
Software CM contains functions related to identification, management, change control,
status, reviews, and deliveries of software systems.  It is the focal point for managing and
controlling the variants of the many types of software artifacts, both during initial development
and in the subsequent evolution during deployment of the software systems.  The existence of a
systematic software reuse environment that is used to produce a product line of software systems
increases the demands on a CM program by an order of magnitude, because the software
components will now be used in multiple systems rather than in an individual system.  For every
version of a system, the CM process will need to track the version of each component used in the
development of that particular system, along with all the dependencies of that version of the
component with other components in the system [Bosch 1999].   The increase in complexity of
the CM process for reuse-based software engineering is based on two considerations [Edwards
1997]:
• Any change to a component must be considered in terms of all systems which use (or
may potentially use) the component.
• Multiple versions of a component must be stored, maintained, and available for use,
due to compatibility issues with other components.
Testing is affected in much the same way that V&V is affected.  Test cases for reusable
components must consider all systems for which the component is intended.  As a minimum,
careful representation of the testing that was performed must be recorded to indicate exactly how
the component was tested.  Test documentation from domain level testing and from testing
within individual systems pertaining to a component should be available to system developers, so
that they may determine if further testing for a particular component is necessary for individual
systems.  This implies a need for uniform test documentation throughout the product line,
including test cases, test inputs, and test results.  There should be little impact on integration and
system testing, as this activity is system specific.
The QA process ensures that the software development (and software evolution) process
and the software products conform to established standards.  This process normally uses
activities such as reviews, inspections, and reviews to ensure conformance, rather than the level
of analysis and testing performed by a V&V process or a testing process.  Most often the QA
effort is directed more toward process than product [Glass 1992].  Obviously the QA process
must adapt to any change in the development process, and so it must to the implementation of a
reuse-based software engineering environment.  QA must ensure that the development is well-
defined, documented, and followed.  While this is not a new to QA, what differs is that there are
now two processes: the domain or product line process and the system process.  The two
processes interact but have different goals and products.  QA must ensure not only that the
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individual processes are defined and followed, but that the process interaction is defined and
followed as well.
The IEEE standard definition for certification is “the process of confirming that a system
or component complies with its specified requirements and is acceptable for operational use”
[IEEE 1990].  (Actually, this is the third of three definitions, where the first two address a written
guarantee and a formal demonstration, respectively, of this confirmation.)  The confirmation of
compliance of an item with its specification can be performed by assessing some combination of
the personnel developing the item, the process by which the item is developed, or the quality
attributes of the item itself [Voas 1998].  The concept of software certification is in itself a
controversial topic, with debate on certification of software engineers, the relationship between a
good process and a good product, and the ability to assess the quality attributes of software
products.  These issues apply to software that is developed under any methodology, including
reuse-based software engineering.  However, reuse-based development introduces further issues
into the certification process.  The reliance on previously developed components (often
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf components) means that the quality of the developers and the
development process of the component may be unknown, leaving product certification as the
only approach.  Needing to understand the implementation of each component removes much of
the advantage of incorporating reusable components in a black-box manner, through an
understanding of the interface and functional descriptions.  Even if the component is thoroughly
understood, knowing and describing the exact conditions under which the component will be
validated (and hence the conditions in which the component may be safely used) is a daunting
task.  The legal implications on warranty and liability from certification of a reusable component
or of a system developed with reusable components are not as yet resolved.  These implications
can impact the developer of the component, the (re)user of the component (who is the developer
of a software system), and the acquirer of the system.
Much work has been performed in defining processes and methods for developing
reusable components and for developing systems using reusable components.  These activities
have extended into development support areas such as reuse libraries and component evaluation.
This work is appropriate, but is insufficient for the purpose of commercial-level software
development.  To achieve the complete implementation of a systematic reuse-based software
engineering process, all aspects of software engineering must be considered, including the
support services such as V&V, CM, QA, testing, and certification.  The issues related to software
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APPENDIX A.  ASSURANCE SCORES FOR THE COMPONENTS OF THE WAITING
QUEUE SIMULATION PRODUCT LINE
Description of the Application Systems within the Waiting Queue Simulation Product Line
1.  CPU Dispatching.  We want to simulate the behavior of a CPU dispatching
mechanism.  We are interested in measuring fairness and throughput.  There is a single priority
queue, with maximum service time (quantum service, Q); once a process has exhausted its
service time, it is queued back, with an increased priority.
2.  Self-Serve Carwash.  We have a set of self-serve interchangeable carwash stations.
Arriving cars line up at the shortest queue (queues of equal length are interchangeable) and do
not change queues subsequently; queues are FIFO, of course.  Service is limited to a maximum
value (but may take less time), and cars are expected to clear the station once the maximum time
has expired.  Arrival distribution is Markovian.  We are interested in monitoring maximum
waiting time (we don’t want anybody to leave before being served) and throughput (we want to
serve as many people as possible).
3.  Check-Out Counters.  We have a number of check-out counters at a supermarket,
some of which are reserved for shoppers with 10 items or less.  Shoppers with 10 items or less
line up in the shortest express check-out queue; others line in the shortest queue reserved for
them.  Once they are lined up in some queue, shoppers do not leave the queue until it is their
turn.  Service time is determined by the shopper (size of his/her cart) and by the productivity of
the cash register attendant.   Arrival rate is Markovian distribution.  The number of stations
increases whenever the longest queue exceeds a threshold value L and decreases by one
whenever the number of stations of each category is greater than one and the length of the queue
is zero.  Whenever a new cash register is open, shoppers at the end of the queue rush to line up at
the station (talk of fairness!) until the length of the queue equals the shortest current queue of the
same type (express checkout, regular checkout).  We are interested in average waiting time and
fairness.
4.  Immigration Posts.  We have a number of immigration stations at an airport, some of
which are reserved for nationals, the others are for foreign citizens.  There are two queues: one
for nationals, the other for foreigners; each queue feeds into the corresponding set of stations,
and there is no transfer between queues.  The number of stations that handle nationals increases
by one whenever the length of the nationals’ queue exceeds some value; and the number of
stations that handle foreigners increases by one whenever the length of the foreigners’ queue
exceeds some other (larger?) value.   The arrival rate is a clustered distribution, as passengers
come by planeloads.  Service time for nationals is constant, and service time for foreigners is
determined by the passenger and by the productivity of the immigration agent attendant.  We are
interested in monitoring throughput.
5.  Check-In Counters.  We have two FIFO queues for passengers at an airline check-in
station: a queue for first class and a queue for coach.  We have two categories of service stations:
first class and coach; the number of stations does not change for the length of the experiment.
The duration of the service is the same for all passengers and all stations of the same class, but
differs from first class to coach.  The arrival rate is Markovian distribution; passengers lines up
at their designated queue and do not leave it until they are served.  Whenever one queue is
empty, the corresponding service stations may serve passengers of the other queue (typically:
first class stations serve coach passengers when no first class passengers are awaiting).  We are
41
interested in monitoring the average waiting time and the maximum waiting time for each class
of passengers.
6.  Round Robin Dispatching.  Same as system 1, but with a FIFO queue; processes that
exceed their time quantum are inserted at the back of the queue.
7.  Self-Serve Carwash, arbitrary service time.  Same as system 2, but without limit on
the service time.
8.  Fair Check-Out Counters.  Same as system 3, but whenever a new counter is open,
it is filled by shoppers at the front of the longest queues (although in practice they are least
motivated to go through the trouble, their queue swapping will probably minimize average
waiting time and maximize fairness).
9.  Multiqueue Immigration Posts.  Same as system 4, but with one queue for each
post; use the policy of system 3 for queue swapping when a new post is created.  Assume also
that passengers go from queue to queue whenever their position in the current queue is farther
(from the head) than the length of another queue.
10.  Fair Multiqueue Immigration Posts.  Same as system 9 with the policy of system 8
for queue swapping when a new post is created.
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Assurance Scoring for the Waiting Queue Simulation Product Line, Part 1
Assumptions:
No component will be used in any systems other than those defined in this product line.
All components will be used for the same (normal) period of time.
Customer Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 32.59
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Customer Queue Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Immigration Posts 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Check-in Counters 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Round Robin Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Fair Check-out Counters 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 19.56
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Event Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.11
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 29.63
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Event List Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 32.59
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Measurement Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.11
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 29.63
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Priority Queue Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.33
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 5.33
 Queue Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-in Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Round Robin Dispatching 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 23.63
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 Queue Category Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.33
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.89 1.78
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.89 1.78
Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.33 2.67
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.33 2.67
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.78 3.56
Round Robin Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.89 1.78
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.89 1.78
Fair Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.33 2.67
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.78 3.56
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 25.78
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Queue Facility Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Check-in Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Round Robin Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 25.26
50
Server Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-in Counters 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Fair Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 22.00
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Server Category Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-in Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 27.70
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Server Facility Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-in Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Round Robin Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 25.26
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Assurance Scoring for the Waiting Queue Simulation Product Line, Part 2
Assumptions
Developer believes the Server, Customer Queue, Priority Queue, Measurement, Event and Event
        List components related to simulating CPU Dispatching can be marketed to five customers
The two Check-Out Counter simulations will be in use for a relatively long period of time
The Customer component will be replaced in all systems in the near future
Customer Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 1 1.63 1.63
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 16.30
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Customer Queue Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Immigration Posts 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Check-in Counters 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Round Robin Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Fair Check-out Counters 2 0 0 0.67 3 0.81 2.44
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 25.00
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Event Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.11
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.48 4.44
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.48 4.44
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 44.44
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Event List Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 48.89
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Measurement Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.11
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.48 4.44
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.48 4.44
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.48 2.96
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 44.44
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Priority Queue Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.33
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 32.00
 Queue Component, Part 1
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 1    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-in Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Round Robin Dispatching 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 26.89
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 Queue Category Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 2
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.33
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.89 1.78
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.89 1.78
Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 3 1.33 4.00
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.33 2.67
Check-in Counters 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.78 3.56
Round Robin Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.89 1.78
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.89 1.78
Fair Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 3 1.33 4.00
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.78 3.56
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 28.44
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Queue Facility Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 3 1.22 3.67
Immigration Posts 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Check-in Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Round Robin Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 3 1.22 3.67
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 27.70
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Server Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 3 1.22 3.67
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-in Counters 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Fair Check-out Counters 3 0 0 1.00 3 1.22 3.67
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 24.69
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Server Category Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-in Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Round Robin Dispatching 4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 30.96
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Server Facility Component, Part 2
DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE DRIVER SCORE
Product Process Personnel
   Complexity 2    Maturity 2    Experience 1
   Precedent 1    Complexity 1    Stability 1
   Testability 1
   Platform 1
   Stability 1 COMPONENT LIKELIHOOD SCORE 1.22
CiSj CiSj CiSj CiSj
SEVERITY LONGEVITY RISK CRITICALITY
Application System Mission Safety Security SCORE SCORE SCORE SCORE
CPU Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash, max
time
2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Immigration Posts 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Check-in Counters 3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Round Robin Dispatching 2 0 0 0.67 2 0.81 1.63
Self-Serve Carwash,
arbitrary time
3 0 0 1.00 2 1.22 2.44
Fair Check-out Counters 4 0 0 1.33 3 1.63 4.89
Multiqueue Immigration
Posts
4 0 0 1.33 2 1.63 3.26
Fair Multiqueue
Immigration Posts








Ci ASSURANCE SCORE 28.52
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math operation Is_Substring (
   s1: string of character,
s2: string of character
) : boolean
explicit definition
there exists s3, s4: string of character (s2 = s3 * s1 * s4)
math operation Actual_Takeoff_Times_Used (




for all fid: FLIGHT_ID (
if there exists q1, q2: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR, t: DISCRETE_TIME (
q = q1 * <(fid,t)> * q2 and db.actual_takeoff_time(fid) > -1
)
then t = db.actual_takeoff_time(fid)
end if
)
math operation Safety_Delays_Met (





for all f1, f2: FLIGHT_ID (
if there exists q1, q2: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR,
t1, t2: DISCRETE_TIME (
q = q1 * <f1,t1> * <f2,t2> * q2
)





math operation Taxi_Times_Met (





for all fid: FLIGHT_ID (
if there exists q1,q2: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR, t: DISCRETE_TIME (
q = q1 * <fid,t> * q2
)




math operation Well_Formed_Runway_Queue (





for all fid: FLIGHT_ID (
if db.runway_used(fid) = m.rid or
(db.runway_used(fid) = empty_string and
db.assigned_runway(m.sid, db.departure_gate_area(fid)) = m.rid)
then In_Line(q,fid, db)
and Actual_Takeoff_Times_Used(q, m, db) and
Safety_Delays_Met(q, m.rid, db) and Taxi_Times_Met(q, m.rid, db)
end if
)





if there exists c: CONFIGURATION, q1: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR (
db.c.id = m.sid and Well_Formed_Runway_Queue(q1, m, db)
)
then Is_Substring (m.q, q1) and
for all ft: FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR (ft is in elements (m.q))
 m.tbegin <= ft.t <= m.tend
math operation Cumulative_Wait_Time (
q: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR,
r: RUNWAY_ID,
db: SMA_Database_Machine) : DISCRETE_TIME
explicit definition
if there exists ft: FLIHT_TIME_PAIR, q1: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR (
q = <ft> * q1
 )
then Cumulative_Wait_Time=ft.t -Pushback_Time(ft.f, db) -db.taxi_time(db.gate(ft.f), r)






type Simulate_Runway_Machine_State is modeled by (
sid: string of character
rid: string of character
tbegin:  DISCRETE_TIME
tend:  DISCRETE_TIME








tend >= tbegin and
cum_wait >= 0 and
initialization




ensures m.ready_to_extract = false and
m.sid=#m.sid and m.rid=#m.rid and




consumes  split: Char_String
)
requiresIs_Allowed_Split_Name (split) and m.ready_to_extract = false
ensures m.sid = split and m.rid=#m.r and
m.tbegin=#m.tbegin and m.tend=#m.tend and








ensures m.rid=runway and m.sid=#m.s and
m.tbegin=#m.tbegin and m.tend=#m.tend and





consumes  begin_time: Integer,
consumes  end_time: Integer
)
requiresbegin_time >= 0 and end_time >= begin_time and
m.ready_to_extract=false
ensures m.tbegin=begin_time and m.tend=end_time and








ensures Proper_Flights_In_Queue(m, db) and
m.sid = #m.sid and m.rid=#m.rid and




produces  flight_number: Char_String,
produces  takeoff_time: Integer
)
requires|m.q| /= 0 and m.ready_to_extract = true
ensures #m.q = <flight_number, takeoff_time> * m.q and
m.sid=#m.sid and m.rid=#m.rid and





 preserves db: SMA_Database_Machine,
 produces  wait_time: Integer
)
ensures  wait_time = Cumulative_Wait_Time (m.q, m.rid, db)
operation Queue_Length_Of (
preserves m: Simulate_Runway_Machine_State,
produces  length: Integer
)
requiresm.ready_to_extract = true
ensures length = |m.q|
operation Runway_Of (
preserves m: Simulate_Runway_Machine_State,
produces  runway: Char_String
)
requiresm.ready_to_extract = true




produces  split: Char_String
)
requiresm.ready_to_extract = true
ensures split = m.sid
operation Begin_Time_Of (
preserves m: Simulate_Runway_Machine_State,
produces  begin_time: Integer
)
requiresm.ready_to_extract = true
ensures begin_time = m.tbegin
operation End_Time_Of (
preserves m: Simulate_Runway_Machine_State,
produces  end_time: Integer
)
requiresm.ready_to_extract = true







allowed_flight_IDs is modeled by set of string of character
allowed_aircraft_types is modeled by set of string of character
allowed_gate_names is modeled by set of string of character
allowed_DGA_names is modeled by set of string of character
allowed_runway_names is modeled by set of string of character
allowed_split_names is modeled by set of string of character
interface
math operation Is_Allowed_Flight_ID (
s: string of character
): boolean
explicit definition
s is in allowed_flight_IDs
math operation Is_Allowed_Aircraft_Type (
s: string of character
): boolean
explicit definition
s is in allowed_aircraft_types
math operation Is_Allowed_Gate_Name (
s: string of character
): boolean
explicit definition
s is in allowed_gate_names
math operation Is_Allowed_DGA_Name (
s: string of character
): boolean
explicit definition
s is in allowed_DGA_names
math operation Is_Allowed_Runway_Name (
s: string of character
): boolean
explicit definition
s is in allowed_runway_names
math operation Is_Allowed_Split_Name (
s: string of character
): boolean
explicit definition
s is in allowed_split_names
math subtype DISCRETE_TIME is integer
exemplar t
constraint
t  >=  0
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math subtype OPTIONAL_DISCRETE_TIME is integer
exemplar t
constraint
t  >=  -1












math subtype OPTIONAL_GATE_NAME is string of character
exemplar g
constraint
Is_Allowed_Gate_Name (g) or g = empty_string








math subtype OPTIONAL_RUNWAY_ID is string of character
exemplar rid
constraint
Is_Allowed_Runway_Name (rid) or g = empty_string








math subtype CONFIGURATION is (
sid: SPLIT_ID,
split: function from DGA_NAME to RUNWAY_ID
)
71




math subtype SMA_DEPARTURE_DB_MODEL is (
aircraft_type: function from FLIGHT_ID to AIRCRAFT_TYPE_NAME
gate: function from FLIGHT_ID to OPTIONAL_GATE_NAME
departure_gate_area: function from FLIGHT_ID to DGA_NAME
runway_used: function from FLIGHT_ID to OPTIONAL_RUNWAY_ID
predicted_pushback_time: function from FLIGHT_ID to DISCRETE_TIME
actual_pushback_time: function from FLIGHT_ID to OPTIONAL_DISCRETE_TIME
actual_takeoff_time: function from FLIGHT_ID to OPTIONAL_DISCRETE_TIME
delay_time: function from AIRCRAFT_TYPE_NAME to DISCRETE_TIME
roll_time: function from AIRCRAFT_TYPE_NAME to DISCRETE_TIME
taxi_time: function from GATE_RUNWAY_PAIR to DISCRETE_TIME
config: set of CONFIGURATION
)
math operation In_Line (




there exists t:DISCRETE_TIME, q1,q2: string of FLIGHT_TIME_PAIR (
q = q1 * <fid,t> * q2
)





if db.actual_pushback_time(fid) > 0
then Pushback_Time = db.actual_pushback_time(fid)







































































requiresIs_Allowed_Flight_ID (fid) and Is_Allowed_Gate_Name (gid)






requiresIs_Allowed_Split_Name (sid) and Is_Allowed_DGA_Name (dga)








type Get_Flights_Machine_State is modeled by (











requiresIs_Allowed_Split_Name (sid) and Is_Allowed_Runway_Name (rid)
ensures for all fid: string of character where (Is_Allowed_Flight_ID(fid)) (
fid is in elements (gf.q) iff db.runway_used(fid) = rid
or (db.runway_used(fid) = empty_string
and db.assigned_runway(sid,db.departure_gate_area(fid)) = rid)
)
and (if there exists s1, s2: string of string of character, f1, f2: string of character (
gf.q = s1 * <f1> * <f2> * s2
)
then
(db.actual_takeoff_time(f1) <> -1 and
 db.actual_takeoff_time(f2) <> -1 and
 db.actual_takeoff_time(f1) < db.actual_takeoff_time(f2)) or
(db.actual_takeoff_time(f1) > -1 and
 db.actual_takeoff_time(f2) = -1) or
(db.actual_takeoff_time(f1) = -1 and
 db.actual_takeoff_time(f2) = -1) and
 db.actual_pushback_time(f1) <> -1 and
 db.actual_pushback(f2) <> -1 and
 db.actual_pushback_time(f1) < db.actual_pushback_time(f2)) or
(db.actual_takeoff_time(f1) = -1 and
 db.actual_takeoff_time(f2) = -1) and
 db.actual_pushback_time(f1) > -1 and
 db.actual_pushback_time(f2) = -1) or
(db.actual_takeoff_time(f1) = -1 and
 db.actual_takeoff_time(f2) = -1) and
 db.actual_pushback_time(f1) = -1 and
 db.actual_pushback_time(f2) = -1 and









#gf.q = <fid,t> * gf.q
operation Number_Of_Flights_To_Runway (
preserves gf: Get_Flights_Machine_State,
   ) : Integer
ensures  Number_Of_Flights_To_Runway = |gf.q|
end SMA_DB_Departure_Get_Flights_Capability
